An approved payment run is only safe if the file the bank receives is the file that was approved.
Payment file tampering happens when a bank upload file is edited after the payment run is approved, changing payee bank details or amounts. Prevent it by generating files directly from the system, restricting who can access them, agreeing record counts and control totals to the approved run, checking payee bank details against the supplier master and requiring dual authorisation in the bank portal.
Most payment runs follow the same path: invoices approved in the ledger, a payment proposal reviewed, a file generated, the file uploaded to the bank, and the payments authorised in the bank portal. The weak point is the gap between generating the file and uploading it. If the file is a CSV or text file saved to a shared folder, anyone with access can open it and change an account number or an amount.
Typical tampering:
Record three figures from the approved payment run before the file is generated: the number of payments, the total value, and a hash total of the account numbers. Then check the same three figures in the bank portal after upload.
A hash total is a sum that has no meaning on its own but changes if any number changes. If your account numbers are in column D of the approved run as text, convert and sum them:
=SUMPRODUCT(--D2:D500)
Use the last six digits if the full numbers are too long for exact arithmetic:
=SUMPRODUCT(--RIGHT(D2:D500,6))
Both formulas need every cell in the range to contain a number, so limit the range to the populated rows. If the bank portal shows count and value only, agree those and add the bank detail check below.
Export the payment lines (from the bank portal's pending payments, or the file) and compare each payee account to the supplier master in Excel. With the master on a sheet called Master (supplier ID in A, account number in C):
=IF(XLOOKUP(A2,Master!A:A,Master!C:C,"MISSING")=C2,"","MISMATCH")
Any mismatch stops the run until explained. This also catches a supplier master change that skipped verification; see verifying supplier bank detail changes.
Fold these steps into your payment run approval checklist.
UK businesses commonly upload Bacs or Faster Payments files; US businesses typically use ACH or wire files. File formats differ, but the gap between approval and upload is the same risk. Check your bank's own guidance on file security and authorisation settings.
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A sum of a field that has no business meaning, such as account numbers, used to show that no line has been altered between approval and upload.
No. Authorisers often approve a total they expect to see. Agree the line detail, or at least the hash total and payee bank details, before authorising.
Avoid it. Excel can alter account numbers and makes editing easy. Check the file's contents through the bank portal or a read-only viewer instead.
Last updated 28 October 2026. General guidance for finance teams; check it against your own policies, systems and local rules.